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Paths of Solidarity 
One More 
Hole 
in the Wall 
The Lunafil Strikers in Guatemala 
• Peter Hogness 
"I was out of town when I first found out," says Paul Filson, the 
union organizer who heard first. "I called my tape at home in New 
York to play back any messages. There was this scratchy voice 
in Spanish—long distance on a bad line—telling me that there was 
a sit-in strike at a textile plant in Guatemala called Lunafil. They 
said they needed our help." 
That was in June, 1987. There had not been a sustained factory 
occupation in Guatemala since the Coca-Cola workers' strike of 
1984-85. In that struggle, a local union that had seen eleven 
members (including three of its presidents) murdered by death 
squads fought and won against a major transnational corporation. 
The union said that the international support they received was 
a decisive factor in their victory. 
The Coke workers' victory was all the more remarkable given 
the killings that had decimated the Guatemalan labor movement. 
Between 1978 and 1984, tens of thousands of Guatemalan civilians 
were murdered by the Army and its death squads, including 
hundreds of trade unionists. The Coca-Cola workers' bold action 
• Peter Hogness is Director of the US/Guatemala Labor Education Project 
(US/GLEP), which is currently organizing support for the Petrosteel and Con-
fecciones Transcontinentales sit-in strikes in Guatemala. For more information, 
write to: US/GLEP, do District 65/UAW, 7th Floor, 13 Astor Place, New York, 
NY 10003. 
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helped break through the curtain of fear left by the massacres, 
and helped inspire a cautious renewal of union activity. 
Now the Lunafil workers were following the example of the 
Coke workers, and no one was quite sure what would happen. 
"Only" five unionists had been murdered since the Army allowed 
a civilian to take office as President in 1986. But the Army was 
still the real power in the country, and the danger to trade unionists 
was still very real. A sit-in strike was pushing the boundaries of 
what would be allowed. So like the Coca-Cola workers, the union 
at Lunafil was appealing for international support. 
The events that followed illustrate how crucial support actions 
by U.S. unionists can be for the heroic struggles of Third World 
workers. That phone call from Guatemala to New York City ended 
up helping keep open a hole in the wall that Lunafil's owners built 
to isolate the strikers. And the Lunafil workers' fight shows the 
importance of penetrating the walls of distance, language and 
culture that separate workers and unionists around the world. 
The Strike & Initial Support 
The issues of the strike were straightforward. The Lunafil plant 
is located in Amatitlan, a town about 15 miles from Guatemala 
City. It produces yarn for the weaving of textiles. In May, manage-
ment had purchased some new spinning machines and proposed 
a new shift system that would have required employees to work 
12-hour shifts on both Saturday and Sunday, with no overtime pay. 
It also would have required work weeks in excess of Guatemala's 
44-hour legal maximum. The union and management agreed to 
put the new shift plan to a vote of the entire workforce, but after 
the plan was voted down by 95% of the workers, management 
announced that it would be implemented anyway. 
On June 9 the union went on strike, with 91 workers occupying 
the plant. They knew they ran a risk of repression, and twelve 
days into the strike, two union members were kidnaped by heavily 
armed men in civilian clothes. The two had gone into the center 
of town to pass out leaflets asking for community support of the 
strike. Suddenly they were hustled into a pickup truck at gunpoint 
and disappeared. The union protested to the National Police, who 
denied any responsibility and said they had no idea where the 
men were. But other union members spotted the two inside the 
local National Police compound, and photographed them there. 
Once the police were made aware of these photographs, they 
released the men unharmed. 
The first response of unionists in the U.S. was a series of 
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telegrams to Lunafil management, the Labor Minister, and Presi-
dent Cerezo. The telegrams demanded that the government 
guarantee the strikers' safety, that force not be used against them, 
and that a settlement be reached under which all overtime would 
remain voluntary. Telegrams of support were also sent to the 
union. Telegrams were sent by several ACTWU locals and joint 
boards, ILGWU 23-25, the UE, District 65/UAW, and locals of 
SEIU, the Teamsters, UAW, RWDSU, and the Paperworkers. 
That this strike drew a response from many unionists in the 
textile and clothing industries was not surprising. One reason was 
that unionists identify with workers in the same or a similar 
industry. Even more important was the fact that textile and 
clothing workers in the U.S. have been hurt badly by capital flight 
and the resulting export of jobs. The worse conditions are abroad 
for clothing and textile workers, the more likely U.S. companies 
are to move production overseas. The more we help foreign 
workers in the industry to defend their rights and raise their living 
standards, the more likely it is that we can preserve those jobs 
in the U.S. In this sense, these telegrams were very much acts of 
solidarity, not charity. 
U.S. labor support for the strike was organized by a group of 
U.S. union activists who had been discussing how to establish a 
permanent center for solidarity with Guatemalan labor—the 
US/Guatemala Labor Education Project (US/GLEP). Several of 
those involved in these discussions had been part of the support 
effort for the Coca-Cola strike—and they were the first to be 
contacted by the Lunafil union. The Project was still just an i d e a -
it had no formal structure, no staff, and no funding. But we felt 
we couldn't wait a few months before we did anything about 
Lunafil—by then the strike might be crushed. 
On July 7, factory manager Leonel Barrios came to the plant 
and told the workers that he had a new proposal to discuss with 
them. Once they had assembled in a shed in the factory's court-
yard, Barrios had nothing to say about new proposals, but instead 
told the strikers that the plant was being permanently closed and 
that they were all fired. As Barrios spoke, about 25 private guards 
from the Ebano security company, armed with rifles and grenades, 
occupied the main factory building. The workers refused to move 
from the factory grounds, and a tense standoff prevailed. The 
workers continued to occupy the courtyard, the gate, and some 
sheds that held raw material and finished products. But they now 
had a minimum of shelter and armed goons watching them 24 
hours a day. 
On July 11 came the union's response—a solidarity demon-
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stration in Amatitlan that drew close to 1,000, with contingents 
from other unions, union organizing committees and student 
groups. The union denounced the supposed "closing" of the plant 
as a maneuver to allow the company to hire a new, non-union 
workforce. 
The Ebano guards refused to let anyone enter the factory 
compound. Water was cut off. Food and water had to be passed 
over the fence—enough for the 80 workers inside. The 11 workers 
who had been outside the plant when the guards invaded camped 
out in front of the gate, and provided the occupiers' link to other 
unions and the community. The strikers' wives and children came 
by to visit for as much of the day as they could, holding hands 
with two or three fingers extended through the chain-link fence. 
The hard line by management drew a response of increased 
international support. In July and August, telegrams and support 
statements came from unionists in Germany, Spain, France, 
Belgium, and the U.S. In August, 18 U.S. union officials signed 
a newspaper ad denouncing the invasion of the plant by the 
paramilitary force from Ebano. The ad asked the government to 
work for the removal of the Ebano guards, guarantee the workers' 
safety, and insist that the company come to a fair settlement. 
Besides an indignant reply from Lunafil management, the U.S. 
union officials' ad drew a more important response—the resump-
tion of negotiations. The company began to talk of possibly re-
opening the factory after all. They offered to give workers 100% 
of their severance pay, and to re-hire up to 25% of the strikers. 
However, they wanted to choose which 25%. When the union said 
it would consider this offer if the company would guarantee to 
re-hire the union's executive committee, the company refused. 
This made clear that the company's goal was to eliminate the 
union. Still, it represented some retreat from the company's earlier 
position. 
In August, another newspaper ad supporting the strike was 
jointly published by Guatemala's three main national labor federa-
tions: the AIFLD-backed CUSG, the Christian Democratic CGTG, 
and the independent UNSITRAGUA. As the first occupation since 
the Coke strike, all unions could see that they had a stake in the 
outcome at Lunafil. This support for the strike across the 
ideological spectrum of Guatemalan labor both reflected and 
encouraged a trend towards unity, which later resulted in the 
formation of UASP (Trade Union & People's United Action). 
The length of the strike began to take its toll. Little of the support 
from abroad had been in the form of financial aid, and other 
Guatemalan unions had little to give. The workers, who had made 
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. . .families together at the fence . . .the wall at Lunafil. 
before the wall was built. 
50 quetzals (about $20) a week before the strike, got only 10 
quetzals a week from the strike fund. Some strikers' families were 
evicted from their homes. Food was scarce. Meanwhile, the 
company was offering severance pay to anyone who quit. Under 
this economic pressure, 17 strikers dropped out in August, and 
by the first week of November another 32 dropped out. The 
situation looked bleak for the 39 who remained, but all of them 
would hold fast until the strike's end. 
Organizing continued in Guatemala. In September the owners 
sent trucks to remove raw material and finished product from the 
factory grounds, but they were blocked when strikers and com-
munity supporters lay down in front of the plant gate. In October, 
a larger team of Ebano guards arrived at the plant and the workers 
feared an attempt to evict them. They went on alert and sent out 
the word to community supporters to come to the plant. An hour 
later the extra guards left, apparently deterred by the union's 
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readiness. Then on December 10, the labor federation UNSIT-
RAGUA organized a march of 1,000 people from Amatitlan to the 
National Palace in Guatemala City. There they met with the new 
Labor Minister, Rodolfo Maldonado, who promised to mediate 
negotiations aimed at re-opening the plant. 
In December, increased aid from international solidarity groups 
enabled the union to increase strike pay to 25 quetzals a week. 
There were even enough funds for a Christmas "bonus" of 100 
quetzals. The promises of the Labor Minister in December had 
not resulted in any government action, but the union continued 
to pressure the government and on February 2 met again with 
Maldonado, demanding that he fulfill his commitments. On 
February 10, the union and management met for the first time 
in months, under Maldonado's auspices. Management agreed to 
carry out studies to see if re-opening the plant was feasible. 
The union at Lunafil, concerned that this might be just a 
company ruse to find an excuse to close the plant, started inquiring 
among its international supporters whether a "union expert" could 
be made available to do a feasibility study, depending on whether 
the company's study seemed honest or not. Although this turned 
out not to be needed, both an ACTWU joint board and a Canadian 
ILGWU local began to line up people who might be able to play 
this role. 
Finding Hooks for a Corporate Campaign 
While the search for a "union expert" went on, a new side to 
the U.S. solidarity campaign was being developed—a corporate 
campaign against Lunafil's shareholders. This was the part of the 
U.S. support effort that broke some new ground, and could be 
particularly useful as a model for future work. 
In late 1987, US/GLEP activists began to discuss what more 
could be done to support the Lunafil strikers—especially whether 
there was any way to put direct economic pressure on Lunafil's 
owners. One advantage that the Coca-Cola strikers had was that 
their employer made a very visible international target. Coke had 
been the target of boycott campaigns in different countries, 
shareholder actions at annual meetings, demonstrations at its 
world headquarters in the U.S., and even work stoppages by some 
of its Scandinavian employees. As a Guatemalan corporation, 
selling to an industrial market, Lunafil did not present such a clear-
cut target. It manufactured no consumer products, had no brand 
name, and had no offices in the U.S. 
The idea occurred to us of pressuring Lunafil's stockholders 
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through other economic interests they might have. The problem 
was that we had no idea who the stockholders were. The 
Guatemalan version of "Incorporated" is "Sociedad Anonima"— 
that is, an ' 'anonymous society'' This means, quite literally, that 
the identity of the owners is a secret, even if the stock is publicly 
traded. The most the Lunafil union could give us was the names 
of some of the plant's managers, but the owners' identities 
remained a mystery 
It was not until February that the Lunafil union was able to 
provide us with some leads that eventually led to the identification 
of four of the five sharesholders—Eli Garsuze, Ronald Werner 
Knoke, Arnoldo Kuestermann, and the majority shareholder Julio 
Raul Herrera. 
We began to research these names, and in March got our first 
break. Arnoldo Kuestermann turned out to be the head of a 
Guatemalan think-tank called ASIES, which has close ties to 
President Cerezo's Christian Democratic Party The most inter-
esting thing about ASIES, for our purposes, was that it received 
funding from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a 
cold-war-oriented funding institute that was created by Congress 
with AFL-CIO support. We had found our hook. 
On March 21, Noel Beasley, Midwest Director of ACTWU and 
a US/GLEP Board Member, wrote Kuestermann that: "U.S. unions 
have played a major role with the NED. I am disturbed to see a 
union-supported project donating money to an institute linked to 
the owners of Lunafil, a company guilty of serious anti-labor 
practices.'' Kuestermann promptly wrote back to Beasley, assuring 
him of his interest in reaching a settlement as soon as possible. 
He also wrote to the NED, begging them not to cut off his funding. 
In April, US/GLEP organized a three-person delegation to visit 
Guatemala in support of the strikers. Participating were Lance 
Compa, Washington Representative of the UE; Paul Garver, 
Contract Director of SEIU 585 in Pittsburgh; and myself, as staff 
person for US/GLEP. Compa and Garver are both members of 
US/GLEP's Board. When we met with Kuestermann, he pro-
nounced himself completely in favor of dialog and opposed to any 
use of force. He was anxious to convince us that ASIES was doing 
good works. He said apologetically that he was only a minor share-
holder in Lunafil, and that the others were more hard-line (which 
unfortunately turned out to be true). And he got very nervous 
whenever the question of ASIES' sources of funds came up. 
Where our pressure on Kuestermann seems to have made the 
biggest difference was "The Wall." On March 14, the company 
began the construction of a 10-foot high concrete wall, topped with 
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barbed wire, completely around the factory grounds. The clear 
intent of this replacement for the chain-link fence was to break 
the strikers' morale by cutting them off from contact with their 
families, as well as to make it harder to supply them with food 
and water. When the union protested to Labor Minister Maldo-
nado, he replied that this was being done for the workers' own 
safety, so that they could not be assaulted from outside. 
When we arrived in Guatemala in early April, the wall was 
finished except for the installation of a solid steel gate. The old 
chain-link gate was still in place, and was now the only place 
where strikers and their families could see and talk with each 
other. When we met with Kuestermann, we made the wall a 
central issue. He promised to do what he could to prevent instal-
lation of the steel gate. In spite of the sharp conflicts which 
occurred over the next few months, there was no further attempt 
to put in the new gate. 
I arrived in Guatemala City a few days before the other two 
members of our delegation, to finish some of the advance work. 
When I called the office of Julio Herrera, he said that the dates 
I was requesting were impossible "because I have to go to 
Washington. But I could see you now." 
Herrera's office was in a large building in a wealthy residential 
area of Guatemala City—the headquarters of a sugar plantation 
and refinery complex he owns. The white stucco building was 
surrounded by high walls topped with barbed wire, and the 
building itself looked like a cross between a modernistic mansion 
and a fortress. Once past the receptionist's window I was shown 
up a sweeping spiral staircase and into Herrera's office—a large, 
. . .the encampment of the outside strikers. 
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high-ceilinged room with picture windows overlooking a garden. 
Herrera came out from behind his desk—a big, wooden oval. He 
was short, trim, with silver hair, an expensive suit and perfectly 
manicured hands. 
We met for over an hour. Also sitting in was Ronald Werner 
Knoke. Herrera started off with a complete history of the strike 
from management's point of view, emphasizing the many abuses 
and indignities that the stockholders had had to put up with. He 
said he saw no point in negotiations. ' 'The stockholders have been 
through a lot of problems, and we want out. How can you deal 
with a group which has acted illegally?" 
When asked about the wall, he said, "As for the wall, the 
stockholders felt that this country club life (of the strikers) could 
not be allowed to continue." When asked if calling it a "country 
club life" didn't go a little too far, he admitted it might be an 
exaggeration. "But, you know, they were playing football in there! 
They were not working. They were spending their time talking 
to their wives. The point of the fence was to break that contact, 
so that this could not continue." Clearly Herrera did not feel that 
he had to make excuses for his actions. 
In the course of conversation, Herrera said that he was going 
to Washington as the chief lobbyist for a group of sugar producers, 
a trip he said he made every few months. We had found our second 
hook. 
The meeting made things a lot clearer. It had been puzzling us 
how the owners of Lunafil could hold out so long, with no 
production coming out of the plant. Herrera's real money was in 
his sugar interests. For him, Lunafil was small potatoes, and he 
seemed willing to run the company into the ground in order to 
make an ideological point. He was the one we were going to have 
to pressure. 
Before we left Guatemala we met with President Cerezo and 
Labor Minister Maldonado, from whom we got a lot of sympa-
thetic noises but no specific commitments. The meetings probably 
helped to forestall police intervention against the strikers, but we 
left without any illusions that the government could be counted 
on to help. 
At the Hole in the Wall 
Help would have to come first from the strikers themselves, with 
whom we met for several hours. After a dusty, crowded bus ride, 
we arrived at Lunafil—now a walled-in compound as large as a 
football field. 
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Around the gate were seven or eight women and several 
children, sitting close to the fence and talking to some of the 
strikers. Large banners hung from the barbed wire that topped 
both the gate and the tall concrete wall. One such banner 
proclaimed the strikers' determination to "Fight for Union Rights" 
and others demonstrated solidarity from other unions. The blue-
uniformed Ebano guards stayed mostly inside the guardhouse just 
to the left of the gate, but the semi-automatic rifles hanging from 
their shoulders were still quite visible. 
As we spoke with the workers about the strike and about the 
wall, the strikers who camped outside the wall were busy mixing 
cement to fill up holes dug for the new steel gate. Through the 
chain-link gate, strike leader Felix Gonzalez tells us that "the 
owners figure we'll cave in if we can't see our loved ones any more. 
But it just makes us more determined to keep fighting." Gonzalez 
has a quiet, modest manner and an easy laugh. Like most of the 
strikers, his face shows that many of his ancestors have been from 
Guatemala's Indian majority. Dressed in jeans and a t-shirt, he 
is quite a contrast with Mr. Herrera. 
Gonzalez is glad to see the union t-shirts we've brought as a gift 
of solidarity. "We'll have a drawing to see who gets them—it'll 
be a little bit of excitement for us, to liven up the day." Gonzalez 
explains how the workers have organized themselves to make 
small crafts, both for their families to sell for income and to avoid 
going nuts from boredom. 
The workers also spend time on union education. The youngest 
striker, 17-year-old Luis Ramirez, says, "I know my friends are 
having a good time outside. I'll have time for that later. Right now 
I'm learning a lot about struggle and politics." When the strike 
broke out, his choice was clear: "Even though I only worked here 
a little while before the strike began, I knew I belonged here with 
the guys. . . . I have a 15-year-old brother and a 9-year-old sister. 
I'm in here fighting so they'll have a better life." The oldest striker 
is Rumulo Ajche, age 60. He tells us, "For us workers, the struggle 
never ends. With my long experience, I can help the younger guys 
get through it." Like Luis Ramirez, Ajche is not just thinking of 
himself—he says he's here "for the workers who come after me." 
While we talked, family members and the unionists outside 
handed some important things over the gate where there's a break 
in the barbed wire—first food, then water, and then a couple of 
children. Six children have been born to strikers' wives since the 
strike began. One worker jokes that "there better not be any 
more—it's been more than nine months now." Later he confides 
to us that at the beginning workers could sometimes sneak out 
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U.S. labor activists (from left to right) Lance Compa (UE), Paul 
Garver (SEIU) and Peter Hogness (US/GLEP) talk with two 
Guatemalan journalists at the hole in the wall. 
at night for a "conjugal visit," but that in the last few months this 
had become impossible due to tighter scrutiny by the guards. 
The day before we left Guatemala, a notice appeared in the 
newspapers announcing a Lunafil shareholders' meeting for April 
29. The final point on the meeting's agenda was described as 
"Liquidation of the Company." Apparently, Herrera was going to 
wash his hands of the matter before it caused him any more 
trouble. As we got on the plane, we knew we would have to move 
fast. 
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On our return to the U.S., we quickly contacted Congressional 
staffers who had been active on the question of labor rights as 
an international trade issue. We were lucky—a few staffers had 
recently accompanied a delegation of exiled Guatemalan opposi-
tion leaders on a brief return visit. We were able to tap into the 
resulting interest in Guatemala, and almost immediately a 
telegram was sent to Herrera by six members of the House. The 
telegram insisted on a prompt settlement that was fair to the union 
and advised Herrera that "the ongoing Lunafil controversy 
damages your ability to act as an effective spokesperson for the 
Guatemalan and Central American sugar industry." 
The effect of the telegram was felt quickly. In the last few days 
before the stockholders meeting, there was a flurry of negotiations. 
Knoke was back and forth to the plant with proposals almost daily. 
At the meeting, the shareholders voted to make no decisions and 
to analyze the union's proposals further. 
Negotiations continued, and so did our attempts to check out 
Herrera's sugar connection. At the May 6 meeting, Herrera 
complained that the union was "disfiguring" his reputation 
abroad, and expressed interest in a quick settlement. An 
agreement acceptable to the union seemed to be within reach. 
Crackdown & Response 
Then on May 11 came an event that would change everything— 
an attempted military coup. The effort was organized by a group 
of ultra-right-wing junior officers, who demanded a stepped-up 
campaign against Guatemala's guerrilla movement, tighter control 
over the civilian opposition, and a crackdown on the labor move-
ment. Although the coup was put down by the high command, 
the Army's general staff was sympathetic to most of the coup 
plotters' program, and they leaned on Cerezo. By mid-summer, 
most of the demands of the coup had become government policy. 
The Lunafil strikers were some of the first to feel the results. 
In the early morning hours of May 26, 500 riot police invaded 
the plant to assist the removal of tons of finished yarn and raw 
cotton that were still locked up in the factory. Workers from the 
Capritex textile plant across the highway walked off the job and 
formed a crowd at the gate, joining the strikers camped outside 
the gate, the strikers' wives and others from the community. After 
the trucks were loaded, the police attacked the demonstrators with 
tear gas and truncheons, driving them away so the trucks could 
leave. The police were especially vindictive towards the strikers 
who had been living outside the gate, chasing them through the 
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streets of Amatitlan, breaking into the homes of residents who 
offered them refuge. One strike leader was shot in the arm with 
a plastic bullet. 
Later that afternoon, the trucks returned to take out the raw 
cotton. But by then the police had left, and the workers had built 
a barricade of concrete, wood and rocks to block the gate. The 
trucks left without incident, and without the cotton. Two days 
later, three pickup trucks arrived at 1 a.m. carrying about 20 men 
in civilian clothes. They were armed with machine guns and 
accompanied by attack dogs. While some began destroying the 
barricade with hammers and pickaxes, others fired their guns in 
the air and launched a tear gas grenade into the factory grounds. 
In the U.S., we quickly mobilized to protest these attacks. Dozens 
of telegrams were immediately sent to Cerezo demanding no 
further police intervention and a guarantee of the strikers' safety. 
By the next week we had raised the money to place a newspaper 
ad protesting the attacks. These tried-and-true tactics were 
successful in helping to prevent a repeat attack. The police never 
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returned in force, and the raw cotton wasn't removed from the 
plant. But the political atmosphere in Guatemala had shifted, and 
a newspaper ad was not going to shift it back. 
Management claimed no knowledge of the police attack, but 
they hardened their negotiating stand. In early May the company 
had indicated a willingness to re-hire all 39 strikers and to re-open 
with the old shift schedule. When the union and shareholders met 
on June 2, however, the shareholders said they would only take 
back 10 of the strikers. The union insisted on all 39, pointing out 
that Guatemalan law establishes 20 as the minimum number of 
members for a legally registered union. Management agreed to 
go up to 20 and suggested that if the union would consider a 
number lower than 39, they would consider a number higher than 
20. 
After a thorough discussion among all the strikers, some workers 
said they'd be willing to sacrifice their jobs in the interest of 
reaching a settlement. But when the two sides met again on June 
3, management did an about-face. They said the union's willing-
ness to negotiate on this point was too little, too late. It was 20, 
take it or leave it. They gave the union until June 7 to accept, at 
which time they said they'd dissolve the company and sell its 
assets. 
The workers decided they had to hold out, and they continued 
to organize support. In early June, 200 people marched from the 
town of Escuitnla to Amatitlan—a seven-hour walk at a fast pace 
with no rest. On June 17, 300 marchers made the 17 miles from 
Lunafil to the National Palace in a heavy rain. 
In the U.S., once the work of organizing the response to the 
police raid was behind us, we got back to focusing on Herrera's 
sugar connection. The actual quota for each country exporting 
sugar to the U.S. is fixed by the Department of Agriculture 
according to standards set by Congress. The way the sugar price 
support law is written, the Department doesn't have a lot of 
discretion. After a bit of digging, we concluded that while Herrera 
might be wining and dining the bureaucrats involved in making 
this determination, his Sugar Exporters Group was most interested 
in trying to build long-term influence in Congress to change the 
law in the future. 
We then identified members of Congress who were in a position 
to influence this issue and who were either pro-labor or anti-
import. We began a campaign to get local and national unions to 
write to House and Senate members who fit these categories, 
encouraging them to raise the issue of labor rights as a factor in 
determining future sugar quotas. Our most immediate goal was 
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to get one of these members of Congress to write to Herrera and 
express concern for the Lunafil union. Coming from someone who 
could help or harm Herrera's sugar interests (and his role as a 
Washington lobbyist), we figured this would make him sit up and 
take notice. The letter campaign drew national-level support from 
ACTWU and UE, and from locals and regional councils of SEIU, 
the Steelworkers, AFSCME, CWA, and others. 
Negotiations continued in Guatemala during June and July, 
making halting progress. Meanwhile, the broad Guatemalan union 
coalition UASP was holding mass rallies to protest government 
failure to comply with an economic and social accord it had signed 
in March. Plans were discussed for a possible national strike— 
the movement was beginning to recover from the atmosphere of 
fear that had been generated by the May coup attempt. 
On July 20, the Lunafil union and shareholders finally signed 
an agreement. It was a mixed bag, but overall favored the union. 
It provided for the plant to re-open on August 23; for continuation 
of the old shift schedule; for a wage increase; and for an end to 
Lunafil's legal proceedings against the union. But the agreement 
included a bitter pill for the workers to swallow—only 24 of the 
remaining 39 strikers were re-hired. This blow was softened by 
payments of $2000 to each worker not re-hired—a lot of money 
for Guatemalan workers. And it was the workers themselves— 
not management or a lottery—who decided who would return and 
who would not. 
There were strong and conflicting emotions at the plant gate 
on July 22, two days after the agreement was signed. A large crowd 
of families, other unionists and community supporters gathered 
while the Labor Minister and other officials looked on. The main 
feeling was of joy and relief, as families were reunited after over 
a year of communicating from opposite sides of a wire fence. There 
was also sadness that 15 compafieros had to sacrifice their jobs. 
But the agreement was not to be implemented without a compli-
cated endgame. The date for the strikers to return to work was 
pushed back to August 29, then September 19, then October 3. 
Meanwhile over 40 "temporary" workers began production inside 
the plant, working 12-hour shifts many days without overtime pay. 
Management also tried to re-open the shift issue in discussions 
with the strikers, and raised objections to re-hiring one striker who 
had been fired for union activities shortly before the strike began. 
Under pressure from the Lunafil union, management agreed to 
pay the 24 returning strikers their full salary retroactive to August 
23. But on the shift issue and the one striker they refused to re-hire, 
negotiations seemed to be going nowhere. 
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In mid-September the US/GLEP sent Herrera and the Guate-
malan Embassy copies of the union letters to Congress on the 
sugar quota/labor rights/Lunafil connection, threatening to pursue 
the campaign further if the settlement was not implemented. 
Shortly afterwards, management agreed to re-hire the one striker 
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Mr. Raul Valdes-Fauli 
Biscayne Development 
Dear Mr. Valdes-Fauli: 
You may not be aware that one of the Directors of 
Biscayne Development, Julio Raul Herrera, of Guatemala, is 
involved in a major international labor controversy that 
could reflect adversely on Biscayne Development. 
Mr. Herrera is the controlling shareholder of a 
Guatemalan textile company named LUNAFIL, S.A.. . . 
Recently management and the union signed a (two-part) 
agreement to end the strike. . . . 
Unfortunately, Mr. Herrera has chosen to blatantly 
violate each of these agreements. This kind of bad faith 
does not make for a good reputation in the business world. 
It also can become a magnet for protest by concerned labor, 
church and civic organizations. For these reasons. . . I 
would urge you . . .to consider whether Mr. Herrera's 
association with Biscayne Development is in the 
corporation's best interests. 
Sincerely, 
Marty Urra 
President 
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who was in dispute. On the shift issue, an agreement was reached 
that 15 of the strikers would resume work under their old 
schedules, while 9 would work a new schedule proposed by 
management on a two-week "trial basis", at the end of which they 
would resume their old schedule. All 24 were paid their full 
salaries back to August 23. 
Conclusion 
Today the strikers are back at work and on their original 44-hour 
shift. They face a hard battle in rebuilding the union, as manage-
ment has tried to isolate them from the other workers by harass-
ment and even some firings of non-union workers for talking to 
the union members. Management has also formed a "Solidarista 
Association," a kind of company union that preaches labor/ 
management cooperation and offers its own benefit plan ("solidar-
ista' ' groups are an increasingly common union-busting tactic in 
Central America). 
The overall balance sheet of the struggle clearly favors the union. 
Management had declared the plant closed and union workers 
fired. The union stood up to death squads, to massive police raids, 
and to economic hardship. Many sacrifices were made, but they 
won improved conditions for themselves. The struggle now is to 
extend those conditions to all who are employed by Lunafil—a 
struggle which they are able to take up because they still have 
a union. 
But perhaps the best measure of the significance of the Lunafil 
strike is the reaction of other Guatemalan workers. As Guatemala 
entered a new year in 1989, there were factory occupations in 
progress at a plastics factory called Petrosteel and at Confecciones 
Transcontinentales, a clothing plant run by a U.S. women's wear 
company, Play Knits. As the saying goes, imitation is the sincerest 
form of flattery. US/GLEP is organizing support for both actions, 
trying for two more holes in the wall. • 
